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ABSTRACT 
Considerable debate has taken place regarding the amount, adequacy, and 
effectiveness of funding public schools. At the macro level, research is mixed as 
to whether increased funding is associated with improved student performance. In 
some specific cases, such as increased funding for lower class size and early 
childhood education, spending on specific activities has shown to be effective. 
This study examined whether spending categories are associated with 
academic performance. Spending allocations and student performance were 
examined at the school level for the school years 2004-05 through 2007-08. 
Spending data was obtained through the Rhode Island Department of Education 
In$ight financial system. Student performance on the New England Common 
Assessment Program was used. Two models were employed: Model 1 examined 
the aggregate figures for the four years of data regression with a robust estimator 
to examine the association of the spending categories and achievement accounting 
for poverty. Model 2 used multiple regression with a differencing model in an 
attempt to control for unobserved factors such as teacher quality. 
The results of the differencing Model 2 were not conclusive. Model 1 
showed that spending for direct classroom instruction was a significant predictor 
of student achievement. Poverty was also identified as significantly negatively 
associated with student performance. All other allocations were either negatively 
associated or not associated with student performance.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The improvement of student academic performance has been in the forefront of 
national public policy since the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983. Beginning under 
the Reagan presidency and followed by each administration since, the federal role in 
public education has expanded considerably, culminating in the No Child Left Behind 
Act of 2002. Improving educational outcomes through school reform is widely accepted 
by both political leaders and the general public and the level of resources needed to 
sustain improvement is a major topic of debate at the national, state and local level. 
Insufficient attention, however, has been directed to how financial resources are utilized 
and whether the current patterns of allocation are effectively improving student 
performance (Wong, 1999). 
Per-pupil education expenditures have tripled in the United States during the three 
decades from 1960 to 1999 (Odden&Pincus, 2004). However, increased spending has not 
been associated with improved student achievement (Hanushek, 2004). These national 
trends have been mirrored in Rhode Island: Expenditures for public education in Rhode 
Island rose 6% from the years 2000-2006 while many of the highest spending districts are 
the lowest performing. Also, in 2008, spending in Rhode Island was $12,478 per pupil, 
ranking 7
th
 nationally, while student achievement ranked 26
th
among US states (Education 
Week, 2009). 
Symptomatic of the mismatch between funding and achievement has been Rhode 
Island’s historicalfailure to develop a coherent education funding model; Rhode Island 
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became the last state in the country to adopt a funding formula for state aid to education. 
In the spring of 2010, legislation was enacted to institute a statewide funding formula 
which includes: 1) a foundation model in which a basic floor of aid would be established 
for each student; 2) a poverty indicator which provides additional funds to meet the needs 
of students with low socioeconomic status (SES) and correlates to the supports needed by 
children with limited English skills; and3) the capacity to provide local revenue to 
provide equitable and adequate resources(Rhode Island Department of Education, 2010). 
While Rhode Island’s new funding formula addresses equity in providing more 
state aid to communities with limited capacity to raise local revenue, it does not address 
resource allocation within districts. Spending decisions are to be left at the local level 
without regard to how districts are currently utilizing their funds and whether existing 
practice is producing positive results in student achievement. Thus, there is no change to 
the allocation of educational expenditures to improve student learningunless the 
individual district performs this activity on its own initiative. 
In summary, despite the cost and quality problems in American education which 
are mirrored in Rhode Island, existing research has not identified clear relationships 
between spending and performance and has not articulated the factors underlying 
variations in spending patterns across school districts.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine to what extent resource allocations in 
Rhode Island schools are related to student performance. It was expected that the results 
of this study will provide state and local decision-makers with information and strategies 
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for improving the allocation of financial and non-financial resources to support greater 
student success. 
The study employed two models. The first pooled data over the entire study 
period (2004-2008)and tested the association between resource use and student 
achievementwhile controlling for student socioeconomic status. The second model was 
longitudinal, testing the association between changes in resource use and changes in 
student achievement. By testing the association between changes in resource use and 
changes in student achievement, the second model would account for unmeasured school-
level factors that remain constant across adjacent years.  
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between spending on public 
education in Rhode Island and student achievement? 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between annual changes in 
spending on public education in Rhode Island and annual changes in student 
achievement? 
Hypothesis 1: 
Higher per-pupil spending on direct instruction at the school level is associated with 
higher student reading, math, and writing performance.  
Hypothesis 2: 
Higher per-pupil spending on instructional support, operations, leadership and other 
commitments at the school levelare not associated with higher student reading, math, and 
writing performance.  
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Hypothesis3: 
School-level changes in per-pupil spending on direct instruction are associated with 
changes in student reading, math, and writing performance. 
Hypothesis 4: 
School-level changes in per-pupil spending on instructional support, operations, 
leadership and other commitments are not associated with changes in student reading, 
math, and writing performance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Framework: Educational Production Function and Agency Theory 
In a pluralistic, multi-ethnic society like the United States, the purpose of public 
education is a matter of considerable debate. As political and economic issues gain 
prominence, pressure to “reform” education often follows. The tension regarding the 
purpose of public education reflects the competing emphases on the principles of liberty, 
equality and efficiency (Guthrie, 2003). Public policy emerges to address an identified or 
perceived need, and the targets of the policy, as well as those who share the burdens of its 
impact and cost is of particular concern (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  
For many years, education was assessed on an “inputs” basis. Schools were rated 
by criteria such as volumes in the library, number of electives offered and the condition 
of the physical plants. In Rhode Island, the Basic Education Program (BEP) was an effort 
to establish minimum input standards for each district, the assumption being that by 
providing a minimum level of program, students would have the opportunity to meet their 
academic expectations (Galston, 2005; Rhode Island Department of Education, 1989).  
Following the publication of A Nation at Risk, concern over the academic 
performance of American schools became a prominent national issue as attention shifted 
to the outputs of the system. In this context, an argument was made that school reform 
must be viewed from an economic perspective. Hanushek (1994) maintained that little 
systemic relationship has been found between resources and student performance. He 
recommended that schools evaluate educational programs on a cost-benefit basis, 
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improve performance by providing incentives to teachers (merit pay) and parents (school 
choice, privatization of educational services), and allow for continuous adaptation and re-
structuring of existing institutions (Hanushek, 1994). 
Production Theory 
Mainstream economic theory assumes that firms seek to find the most efficient 
use of inputs to maximize profits. Production theory asks what combination of inputs, as 
factors of production, will generate the quantity of output that yields maximum profit. A 
process is inefficient if a different combination of inputs could produce a greater quantity 
of goods or services. Economists use a mathematical equation model known as a 
production function to study production empirically. The production function model’s 
output is a function of various levels of inputs (Mankiw, 2003). 
Production theory holds that resources allocated toward activities that are more 
proximally related to student outcomes will result in better student performance. This 
implies that resources dedicated to direct instruction will improve student outcomes more 
than resources dedicated to activities without a strong relationship with student outcomes. 
The production function in education examines the output of a school system, 
measured in standardized test scores, graduation rates, and years of schooling, for 
example, against the input variables, such as expenditures on classroom instruction, 
operations, libraries, extracurricular programs, or other activities (Monk, 1990; 
Hanushek, 1979). Education production models attempt to predict the factors that 
maximize output. As a result of the application of economic principles to education 
policy, Hanushek asserts that “Reform will come more assuredly from an improved 
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decision process that focuses attention on student performance than from further attempts 
to overwhelm the problems of schools with resources” (Hanushek, 1994, p 151). 
The production function is useful tool for economic analysis but has limits that 
must be taken into consideration. The narrow use of test scores as the sole output of an 
educational system overlooks the diverse functions and responsibility of schools. For 
example, the federal government has directed most of its educational spending to counter 
the inequity that arises from class, language, race, and disability. Funding for education is 
critical to produce the societal goal of liberty and equality by providing educational 
opportunity, regardless of socioeconomic status (Wong, 1999). In addition, a strictly 
economic analysis of the production function ignores the complicated political forces that 
operate in school systems. 
The production function also assumes that educational organizations work in 
concert to achieve like goals in student achievement (Odden&Picus, 2004). However, 
contemporary implementation study recognizes the complexity of putting a policy into 
practice. The goals, targets and tools of a particular policy interact with the people who 
are affected and the culture of the local setting where the policy is enacted. Cross-system 
and organizational relationships affect the production function in terms of policy 
implementation. School systems are constrained by sources and amounts of revenue, the 
misalignment of mission due to the agency problem, employee contracts, state and 
federal regulations, and other aspects of production. Unlike private firms, educational 
institutions do not control their student and family inputs. Political realities must be 
considered along with an economic approach to the education production function 
thatcan identify how resources are allocated and their relationship to student achievement 
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(Loeb & McEwan, 2006). The relationship between spending and outcomes can be 
examined through agency theory (Honing, 2006). 
A production formula applied in a manufacturing context may produce more 
definitive results then when used in an educational setting, given the fact that public 
educational institutions have multiple goals beyond achievement tests as outputs, and 
have far more variables associated with the inputs, most notably the students. 
Nonetheless, economic production theory has a place in the financial analysis of school 
districts to examine if resources are allocated effectively. 
Agency Theory 
There are two key barriers to using an education production model to improve 
educational outcomes. First, the relationship between education inputs and outputs 
remains poorly understood. Second, assuming perfect knowledge of the production 
function and the interest of a district to put the production function into place, the optimal 
allocation of resources may not be employed. This is a result of both the political realities 
of school systems and the self-interested behavior of actors in the system. 
The principal-agent problem arises when a principal compensates an agent for 
performing certain acts that are useful to the principal and costly to the agent, and where 
there are elements of the performance that are costly to observe.The misalignment of 
interests among administrators and management (the district) and agents (teachers) is an 
example of an agency problem (Pratt &Zeckhauser, 1985; Ross, 1973).Agency theory is 
the study of the behavior of principals and agents in the presence of agency problems. In 
the context of this study, teachers and administrators likely have numerous interests that 
differ from those of the district, including personal benefits such as pay, job security and 
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working conditions. Given the strength of unions in public education, many of these 
preferences are institutionalized, at the expense of efficient allocation of resources.  
However, as shown by differences in teacher contracts, union strength varies 
substantially across districts, resulting in variations in the extent to which union 
preferences are institutionalized. 
In a business illustration, the principal could be the factory owner, and two types 
of agents are the sales staff and production workers. The owner (principal) wishes to 
maximize profits, and may do so in more than one way: s/he may attempt to align the 
agents with his goals by profit sharing, increasing production incentives, sales bonuses, 
or incentives for meeting production targets; another owner may attempt to maximize 
profits by keeping expenses low. S/he may not share information with the workers and 
thus increase the risk of creating an agency problem. The workers may feel far removed 
from the goals of the company and may form a union to protect their working conditions 
and job security. 
When applied to public schools, agency theory becomes far more complex. The 
workers in a school system such as central administrators, building principals, teachers, 
classroom aides, clerks, and custodians, filter policy and district goals through the lens of 
their own experience. These groups generally promote and protect their vested interests 
in terms of their wages, working conditions and institutional power structure. Goals and 
policies that are viewed as inconsistent with their interests are likely to face opposition 
(Malen, 2006).  
 
Production Function and Agency Theory in Rhode Island Public Education 
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The multiple layers of principal-agent relationshipsinfluence the allocation of 
resources for public education in Rhode Island. In terms of state aid for education, the 
State, through the Department of Education (RIDE), is the principal and the districts are 
agents in terms of providing state assessment data, meeting grade level and grade span 
curriculum expectations, and meeting graduation requirements and other responsibilities 
under state laws and regulations. The districts, through their local school committees, are 
principals whose respective agents are administrators, teachers and non-instructional 
staff, whose primary interest may not be directly related to student achievement. Schools 
provide a service that cannot be measured by their profit or loss. Instead, output in the 
form of assessment results, graduation rates, community support, and school climate is 
multidimensional and difficult to measure. What a school produces in terms of increased 
test scores or graduation rates is the result of the contributions of numerous individuals 
over time (Loeb & McEwan, 2006).  
In addition to principal/agent relationships, communities are influenced by 
political, fiscal and demographic realities in the allocation of resources. For example, 
districts with relatively small school population and high property value per pupil have 
ample resources and can meet local need by providing jobs with security and benefits to 
local residents (Galston, 2005). In urban districts, which receive a higher proportion of 
state aid relative to the local contribution in order to serve a higher percentage of low-
income students, teacher contracts often provide generous benefits to agents/teachers 
whose primary goal may be higher wages and post- retirement benefits (Grubb et al, 
2006). 
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Lack of community resources and small amounts of state aid may limit per-pupil 
spending. The local political decision to dedicate more local resources to municipal 
services may impact educational spending as well. This situation requires a school district 
to prioritize spending to direct instruction (basic facilities, curriculum offerings and 
teachers) as the school budget hovers at a break-even threshold. Once the threshold is 
met, however, districts tend to spend on more peripheral purposes to meet community 
needs: employing more local residents (maintenance workers, classroom aides, crossing 
guards), providing more student support (guidance, remedial and gifted teachers), adding 
enrichment programs (after school activities, sports, field trips), and enhancing facilities 
(building renovations, vehicle purchases, technology upgrades). The spending beyond the 
threshold may meet community needs and provide desired programs, but may not be 
directly related to academic achievement (Picus&Fazal, 1995). 
“The politics of resource allocation over the last thirty years can be characterized 
as a process of layering, adding more social responsibilities and bureaucratic guidelines 
to the school’s core instructional functions” (Wong, 1999, p15). With the passage of 
time, layers of decisions become institutionalized and rarely change. This is true at all 
levels of government. At the federal level, rules on compensatory funding restrict the 
local district’s ability to utilize funds creatively; state laws passed years before continue 
to dictate school decisions in a different environment, and locally negotiated teacher 
contracts restrict schools’ ability to assign staff where they can best meet student needs 
(Wong, 1999). 
How districts allocate resources may be examined by comparing the per-pupil 
expenditures allocated to direct instruction to other expenditures. A systematic 
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examination of allocation processes can provide the knowledge base for school reformers 
to redesign decision rules to improve student performance (Wong, 1999).  
Factors Affecting Achievement 
 The educational production function must take into account the variations that 
occur between the inputs to the system. The different backgrounds and abilities that the 
children bring to school determine whether teachers can begin their instruction at a 
remedial or accelerated pace. The socio-economic status of children has been shown to be 
strongly related to predicting student achievement, as has class size, teacher quality, and 
other factors. 
Student Socio-Economic Status 
Beginning with the Coleman Report (1966), socio-economic status (SES) at the 
student level has been found to be one of the strongest correlates of academic 
performance. The correlates at the school level are even stronger. Family SES sets the 
stage for students’ academic performance both by directly providing resources at home 
and by indirectly providing the social capital that is needed for school success (Coleman, 
1988). As a result of current educational and social policies, students who are at risk 
because of family SES are more likely to end up in schools with limited financial 
resources (Reynolds & Walberg, 1992,Sirin, 2005). Low SES schools have important 
differences from their affluent counterparts in terms of quality of instruction, materials, 
teacher experience, and class size (Wenglinsky, 1998). In addition to the quality of 
instruction, family SES is related to the quality of relationships between school personnel 
and parents (Watkins, 1997). Thus, SES not only reflects the effect of resources at home, 
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but is also associated with social capital and its effect on academic achievement (Sirin, 
2005). 
 Student poverty is negatively correlated with student outcomes, and usually 
significantly so.Student poverty is also significantly and negatively correlatedwith the 
qualifications of teachers; that is, the less socially advantaged thestudents, the less likely 
teachers are to hold full certification and a degree intheir field and the more likely they 
are to have entered teaching withoutcertification (Darling-Hammons, 1999). 
 Despite these limitations, there have been interventions that have improved the 
educational achievement of those who might otherwise fail in school because of their 
family background. For example, small school and class size (Finn & Achilles, 1990; 
Glass & Smith, 1989; Grissmer et al., 1998; Krueger, 1998), early childhood education, 
federal programs such as Title 1 and Head Start, after-school programs and summer 
school sessions (Entwisle& Alexander, 1994), and qualified school personnel (Wang, 
1998), have all been found to be important factors in reducing the achievement gap 
between children of the "haves" and the "have-nots." Future educational and social 
programs have the potential to provide more support for these and other innovative 
programs that can lift the educational achievement of those who are at risk for school 
failure due to family SES. Without such support, the current system is likely to produce 
an intergenerational cycle of school failure because of family SES (Sirin, 2005). 
 Data on free and reduced-price lunches are consistently used as a proxy for SES 
because of their link to the government’s poverty guidelines, are available for every 
student, they are nonintrusive, theyare simple (eligible, not eligible), and they can be 
obtained relatively cheaply because information are taken directly from school records. 
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These characteristics help to explain the continued popularity of this variable as a 
measure of SES (Harwell &LeBeau, 2010).  Harwell &LeBeau caution that use of free 
and reduced lunch data has its limitations: eligibility is a poor measure of a student’s 
access to economic resources; participation rates decline with increases in grade level; 
status is theoretically available for every student, however, failure to respond to the 
program results in a classification of non-free and reduced, and a resulting inappropriate 
evaluation of SES. 
 Multiple linear regression procedures produced strong evidence that the 
socioeconomic status of the district was the predominant predictor of student 
performance on the 2003 Washington Assessment of Student Learning Reading and 
Mathematics subtests for 4th and 7th graders. Positive correlations that emerged between 
actual levy percentages and student achievement provided evidence that through 
equitable, adequate, and appropriate public school fiscal practices, Washington school 
districts that are small and rural have the potential to overcome a portion of the strong 
and negative association between poverty and student outcomes (Diaz, V., 2008) 
Although at nine months of age there are no detectable cognitive differences 
between black and white babies, differences emerge as early as age two, and by the time 
black childrenenter kindergarten they are lagging behind whites by 0.64 standard 
deviations in math and 0.40 in reading (Fryer & Levitt, 2004). On every subject at every 
grade level, there are large achievement differences between black children and white 
children that continue to grow as they progress through school. Even accounting for a 
host of background factors, the achievement gap remains large and statistically 
significant (Fryer, 2010, Neal, 2006). 
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 Fryer and Levitt (2006) take a pessimistic view of educational interventions to 
address the gaps in student SES. They state that the attempts to close the achievement gap 
such as early childhood interventions Head Start, Nurse-Family Partnership, and the 
Abecedarian Project, boost kindergarten readiness, but the effects on achievement often 
fade once children enter school (Krueger & Whitmore, 2001; Anderson, 2008). More 
aggressive strategies that place disadvantaged students in better schools through busing 
(Angrist& Lang, 2004) and school choice plans (Rouse, 1998; Krueger & Zhu, 2002; 
Cullen et al., 2005; Hastings et al., 2006), have also left the racial achievement gap 
essentially unchanged. 
 The lack of progress has fed into a long-standing debate among scholars, 
policy-makers, and practitioners as to whether schools alone can close the achievement 
gap or whether the issues children bring to school are too much for even the best 
educators to overcome. Proponents of the school-centered approach refer to anecdotes of 
excellence in particular schools or examples of other countries where poor children in 
superior schools outperform average Americans (Chenoweth, 2007). Advocates of the 
community-focused approach argue that teachers and school administrators are dealing 
with issues that originate outside the classroom, citing research that shows racial and 
socioeconomic achievement gaps are formed before children ever enter school (Fryer & 
Levitt, 2004; 2006), and that one-third to one-half of the gap can be explained by family-
environment indicators (Phillips et al., 1998; Fryer & Levitt, 2004). In this scenario, 
combating poverty and having more constructive out-of-school time may lead to better 
and more-focused instruction in school. Coleman et al. (1966), in their report on equality 
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of educational opportunity, argue that schools alone cannot treat the problem of chronic 
underachievement in urban schools. 
 
Class Size Reduction 
Under specific conditions, class size reduction has been associated with improved 
student performance. In the randomized Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio 
(STAR) experiment, the state of Tennessee tested the effect of smaller class size on 
student achievement. This study ran for four years and was implemented for a cohort of 
kindergartens beginning in 1985. The study continued until the students completed third 
grade, and included over 11,600 students. Results from the experiment showed a strong 
and lasting effect of smaller class sizes. The presence of classroom aides was not 
significant. Students in smaller classes outperformed their counterparts in large classes, 
and the more years they stayed in reduced sized classes, the longer-lasting were the 
benefits. In addition, the effect sizes were significantly greater for minority students in 
the smaller classes, based on reading and mathematics performance (Finn & Achilles, 
1990; Grissmer et al., 1998; Krueger, 1998). 
 Findings in Wisconsin’s Student Achievement Guarantee in Education (SAGE) 
are consistent with the STAR experiment.The Student Achievement Guarantee in 
Education (SAGE) was designed to improve the academic achievement of children living 
in poverty by: 1) reducing class size to fifteen students in grades one and two; 2) staffing 
before and after school programs; and 3) conducting extensive staff development. A 
quasi-experiment was conducted by examining the performance of students in the SAGE 
schools with a comparable population in a non-SAGE control group. The results 
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demonstrated that participation in all the components of the SAGE program was a 
significant predictor of success in later grades (Molnar, Smith, Zahorik, Palmer, 
Halbach&Ehrle, 2000). 
Massive class size reduction programs must calculate the ability of facilities to 
provide sufficient classroom space and the availability of qualified teachers necessary to 
meet the increased demand. When California undertook a similar, state-wide initiative to 
reduce class sizes, there were immediate problems of teacher shortages, insufficient 
classroom space, and higher costs. The California class-size reduction program (CSR) 
used an infusion of state funds to reduce class sizes in grades K-3 from twenty-eight to 
twenty students. Similar to the STAR program, the California CSR found smaller but 
statistically significant differences in reading, math and language between students in 
smaller classes and students in larger classes. Because of the resulting facilities issues and 
shortage of teachers that affected less affluent districts, Bohrnstedt and Stecher (1999) 
observed that rather than improve greater opportunity for learning, the California 
initiative increased the inequities between schools that served the wealthy and those that 
served lower-income students. 
 It is important to note that pupil-teacher ratios and class size are not necessarily 
the same.Data on pupil-teacher ratios reflect the total number of teachers and students at 
a given time, but not their utilization. For example, a district may have only two teachers, 
one who spends all day in class with the students and the other who is department head, 
and spends all day evaluating the lesson plans of the classroom teacher. In this case, the 
pupil-teacher ratio is half that of the class size experienced by the students. If teachers are 
required to meet fewer classes during the day than the number of classes that each student 
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takes, the pupil-teacher ratio will be less than the average class size. Some teachers are 
also assigned to various duties outside the regular classroom, such as lunch, study hall or 
corridor supervision. Thus typical class sizes observed in schools tend to be larger than 
measured pupil-teacher ratios. Class size is defined in teacher contracts in terms of 
fairness as opposed to student achievement (Hanushek, 1999). 
 In conclusion, class size reduction, under specific circumstances, is a predictor of 
student achievement. 
Teacher Quality 
The salaries and benefits for teachers account for the largest portion of a school 
budget and thus are the main component of the production function. It is implicit that 
teacher quality and effective practice would be associated with student achievement. 
There is evidence that the strategies employed by teachers as well as their 
education source and levels have an influence on student performance (Haycock, 1998; 
Rivkin, et. al, 2005), Students learn more from teachers who have graduated from higher-
rated institutions, and in the case of mathematics, students learn more from teachers with 
certification in mathematics and degrees in and courses related to mathematics (Wayne 
&Youngs, 2003). Studies linking teacher scores on tests of academic ability to student 
achievement have led some to believe that general academic ability and verbal skills are 
measureable predictors of teacher quality (Ferguson & Ladd, 1996; Hanushek, 1996). 
When studies have examined teacher knowledge of both subject matter and how to teach, 
they found that knowledge of methodology also had a strong relationship to student 
achievement (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; Rivkin, Hanushek&Kain, 2005; 
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Wenglinsky, 2002).Characteristics such as education level (percentage of teachers with 
master’sdegrees), show a positive but less strong relationships with education outcomes 
(Darling-Hammond, 1999).  
Research on the impact of teacher quality on student achievement revealed that 
students' exposure to successive years of poorly qualified teachers during the formative 
educational stages, impacts long-term achievement. Yet, the research also shows that 
students from low-income and minority communities are often served by the least 
qualified teachers (Ferguson, 1998; Sanders & Rivers, and the Education Trust, 1998). 
Partial correlations confirm a strong, significant relationship of teacher quality 
variables to student achievement, even after controlling for student poverty and for 
student language background. Darling-Hammond (1999) identified teacher certification 
as a predictor of student achievement. She found the strongest, consistently negative 
predictors of student achievement, also significant in almost all cases, were the 
proportions of new teachers who are uncertified (Darling-Hammond, 1999, Darling-
Hammond, L., & Sykes, G.2003). Teacher characteristics of verbal ability, exam scores 
and experience studied in production function research, bear a stronger and more 
consistent relationship with pupil performance on achievement tests, than do other 
characteristics in terms of teacher ability (Jefferson, 2005).  
Leadership studies have had the same mixed results as thosewhichexamined 
teacher quality. Waters, Marzano and McNulty (2003) identified twenty-one leadership 
responsibilities associated with improved student performance in their meta-analysis. 
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They acknowledge, however, that poor leadership is associated with negative student 
performance. 
 Other Influences on Achievement 
Research has shown that numerous factors influence student achievement, many 
of which are not related to financial intervention and are outside the production function.  
 A number of researchers have identified parental expectations as significant to 
student performance in school and are critical to student academic achievement. High 
expectations from parents are generally associated with higher levels of educational 
attainment. Effective parenting practices associated with high levels of academic 
achievement include expectations that children earn high numerical grades on 
schoolwork. In addition, the research suggests that child rearing beliefs, provisions for 
academically enriching home environments, and standards of acceptable behavior in and 
out of school are equally important to academic achievement (Jencks and Phillips, 1998; 
Okagaki&Frensch, 1998, Wong, 1990). 
Parental education and social economic status have an impact on student 
achievement, although the exact nature is not clear. Phillips (1998) found that parental 
education and family socioeconomic status alone are not the only predictors of student 
academic achievement. Ferguson (1991) posited that in addition to SES, parental 
education accounted for variance in students test scores. Other researchers contend that 
dysfunctional home environments, low parental expectations, ineffective parenting, 
language differences and high levels of mobility might account for lower levels of 
academic achievement among students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds 
(Frymier&Gansneder, 1989; Laosa, 1978). 
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The literature has identified the lack of quality preschool education for minority 
children as a factor contributing to the achievement gaps between ethnic minority and 
non-minority students. Based on evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (1998), many minority children start school with academic preparation that lags 
behind their white counterparts. 
School resources are complex, and they compound. Abstract resources related to 
innovative teaching, staff development, planning time, teacher control and efficacy, and 
certain student support services are not always associated with financial commitments. 
These unique, personal factors can be as powerful and consistent in their effects as class 
size, teacher experience, or salaries, the resources than have dominated prior research. 
Furthermore, the factors leading to higher levels of complex and compound resources are 
variables such as school autonomy, collegial decision-making, and distributed leadership, 
whereas expenditure and revenue patterns are effective only in explaining simple 
resources (Grubb, 2009). 
The Relationship between Spending and Student Achievement 
Darling-Hammond (1999) used data from a 50-state survey of policies, state case 
study analyses, the 1993-94 Schools and Staffing Surveys (SASS), and the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), to study the ways in which teacher 
qualifications and school inputs are related to student achievement across states.  
She found that at the aggregate state level, it was difficult to establish a direct 
relationship between spending and achievement. Per-pupil spending showed a significant 
positive relationship with student outcomes in 4th grade reading in 1993-94, but no 
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relationship with student outcomes in mathematics. This might be the case, the author 
theorized, because the spending measureincorporated resources spent not only on teacher 
salaries and professionaldevelopment but also on class sizes and other resources that may 
especiallysupport students in the early grades as they are learning to read. 
Althoughsalaries and spending are strongly related to one another, teacher salarylevels, 
unadjusted for cost of living differences, are not correlated with student outcomes when 
aggregated to the state level. Other school resources, such as pupil-teacher ratios, class 
size ratios, and the proportion of teachers in the school staff showed weak and rarely 
significant relationshipsto student achievement when they were aggregated to the state 
level (Darling-Hammond, 1999). 
Studies of spending at the district level, however, have revealed patterns of 
effectiveness.  Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, (2003) compared district spending 
and achievement levels in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and New Mexico. They found 
high-performing districts spent more on instruction as a share of current expenditures 
than low-performing districts, while in three states high-performing districts spent more 
on instruction per-pupil and employed more teachers per 1,000 students. The differences 
in resource allocation between the low-performing and high-performing groups were 
reduced in two of the four states when the comparisons controlled for demographic 
factors and socioeconomic status. A majority of the twelve districts identified as 
improving (but not high achieving) spent more per-pupil in instruction and instruction-
related areas, and also increased allocations for these areas faster than comparison 
districts over the five-year period examined. At the same time, the twelve improving 
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districts were found to re-allocate resources away from administrative and other non-
instructional areas (Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, 2003). 
Districts with higher student academic performance spend more per-pupil on 
instruction and regular education programs. Expenditures on instruction account for 
almost sixty percent of operating expenditures. Program expenditures for regular 
education account for nearlytwo-thirds of program expenditures (Alexander, et. al, 2000). 
High-performing districts demonstrate different resource allocation patterns in 
specific fiscal and staffing categories than low-performing districts. If the goal is to 
improve student performance, the key variables appear to be more intensive use of staff 
and greater professional development activities. Performance is associated with higher 
spending for instruction, tests and teaching materials and number of teachers, as well as 
lower spending for central office administrationand number of administrative staff. In 
addition, variations in capital outlays (spending on facility construction and 
maintenance), school-level administration (principal's office), and teacher education 
levels, were not associated with variations in achievement (Odden&Picus, 2004; 
Wenglinski, 2002).  
 Similarly, expenditures for functions outside of instruction, including school 
administration, instructional media, guidance, health services, extracurricular activities, 
and staff development, fail to show a significant relationship with math and reading 
performance once all of the student and school control variables are considered. The 
relationship between school expenditures and student achievement depends on how 
money is spent (Harter, 1999). 
The Effect of Teacher Unions on Funding 
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In addition, the unionization of both teachers and non-certified staff in the public 
schools can have an impact on student achievement by the potential diversion of 
resources from activities that directly benefit students. Through the creation of rigid 
contracts patterned on the industrial model, school administrators are denied the 
flexibility to assign teachers and staff to where they will be most effective (Moe, 2009). 
Such difficulties lie at the root of the two fundamental problems that undercut 
accountability in schools. The agency problem arises because school employees (the 
agents) have their own interests distinct from those of the authorities (the principals, 
central office administrators, and school boards). The agents have institutional power 
giving the former the incentive and the capacity to resist top-down efforts to hold them 
accountable. The political problem arises because the authorities are elected officials who 
are responsive to the political power of school employees and thus have incentive to 
ignore true accountability. If school accountability is to succeed, reformers need to break 
from top-down methods of control and recognize that a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches is more likely to yield results (Moe, 2003). 
 Funds raised at the local level are especially impacted by union agreement. Most 
of the dollars subject to local control are allocated via teacher hiring, salary increases, and 
work assignment decisions, which are structured by collective bargaining agreements. 
School boards often enter into these agreements with poor understanding of how funds 
are currently used and what a teacher labor contract will cost. In many recent cases, local 
school boards have approved contracts that would create significant budget deficits only 
two or three years later. Boards also frequently commit to pay teacher healthcare and 
pension contributions that cost little in the year they are made but have major “balloon 
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payments” later (Loeb and Miller 2007; Podgursky&Ehlert, 2007). As a result, many 
districts have limited flexibility in the ways they use locally raised funds. Districts also 
have a great deal of difficulty knowing precisely how education resources are spent (Hill, 
Roza& Harvey, 2008).  
 One contractual area where educational funds are diverted from classroom 
instructionis in post-retirement benefits. Upon retirement, some contracts provide health 
care benefits to retirees and their spouses. These contract provisions are indicative of 
strong union bargaining that gives direct benefits to union members no longer providing 
service and consumes considerable resources that might be used in the classroom for the 
benefit of students (Education Partnership, 2006). 
Conversely, when strong management responsibilities are emphasized in 
collective bargaining agreements, the potential rises to align district goals between 
principals and agents. In 2004, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and Chicago Teachers 
Union signed a new collective bargaining agreement that gave principals the flexibility to 
dismiss probationary teachers (defined as those with less than five years of experience) 
for any reason, and without the elaborate documentation and hearing process typical in 
many large, urban school districts. Results suggest that the policy reduced annual teacher 
absences by roughly 10% and reduced the prevalence of teachers with 15 or more annual 
absences by 20%. The effects were strongest among teachers in elementary schools and 
in low-achieving, predominantly African-American high schools, and among teachers 
with high predicted absences. There is also evidence that the impact of the policy 
increased substantially after its first year (Jacob, 2010). 
The Allocation of Resources in Schools 
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 Research has produced a great deal of information about how dollars are 
distributed to school districts. However, there is insufficient data in the research on how 
to put dollars to productive use. From recent studies, it is known that most school district 
budgets are spent at and within school sites for a wide range of student services such as 
instruction, school leadership, counseling services, supplies, and materials. The 
remaining expenditures support the district administration, transportation, utilities, tax 
collection, insurance coverage, and other business and operating expenses (Odden& 
Archibald, 2001; Picus&Fazal, 1995). Nationally, spending for instruction represents 60 
% of state and local operating expenditures (Odden& Busch,1998; Picus, 2001; 
Picus&Fazal, 1995).  
 Researchers have found that school districts are consistent in the way they 
allocate resources (Miles & Darling-Hammond, 1998). When funding levels rise due to 
state aid or property tax increases, districts use operating funds primarily for smaller class 
sizes and teacher pay increases. When more federal, grant or restricted funds are 
available, districts enhance instructional programs with new technology, teacher aides, 
and professional development linked to the program. (Picus&Fazal, 1995). 
Most states were closely clustered around the national average (61.7%) in terms 
of the allocation toward direct instruction share of expenditures for the year 1999-2000. 
Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma and the District of Columbia 
spent less than 58.0 percent of their current expenditures on instruction while three states, 
New York (68.1%), Maine (66.9%), and Massachusetts (66.8%), spent more than two-
thirds of their expenditures on instruction (Johnson, 2003).  
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Grubb (2009) maintains that public schools are structured to poorly allocate 
resources. First, public education is driven by conventional interest group politics. The 
demand for jobs often is more powerful than that for enhanced learning, and so battles 
over the level and distribution of spending dominate educational politics. Second, several 
characteristics of schools as organizations: loose coupling, organizational inertia, 
instability, disagreement about goals, and the sheer effort of instruction, make it difficult 
to ensure changes in schools and teachers. In the existing fiscal climate, the lack of 
flexible resources may inhibit reform because teachers and administrators do not have the 
time to change their practices. Reforms that entail jointly necessary changes rather than 
piecemeal reform are particularly difficult under the conditions in many schools, 
including disagreements over goals and pedagogies, instability in personnel, and 
inconsistencies in perceptions of roles. Third, resources are inflexibly committed to 
salaries and benefits covered by contracts that cannot be changed in the short run. Even 
long-run changes may entail political battles, especially with unions. Other resources are 
embedded in school buildings and land, which are difficult and expensive to reconfigure. 
As incremental budgeting prevails, marginal changes occur from year to year. Many 
reforms end up being "more of the same," and if the old uses of resources were not 
particularly effective, the new ones will not be either(Grubb et al, 2006). 
Schools often spend much less money per-pupil on core courses such as English 
and mathematics than on elective courses. Although results vary somewhat among the 
districts, class sizes (large classes for core courses, smaller classes for special electives), 
teacher salaries (senior teachers claim the elective courses for themselves), and different 
workloads (senior teachers often teach fewer courses), work together to skew spending. 
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Hence, students in elective courses get the benefit of more spending than students in core 
courses that determine high school graduation (on which state accountability plans focus) 
(Roza, 2008). District and school accounting can hide these spending patterns, and 
district leaders and principals are often unaware of how much they are spending or what 
other uses might be made of the same funds (Hill, Roza& Harvey, 2008). 
Principals and teachers would often make different choices about use of the same 
money if they could. Schools in which principals have different degrees of control over 
spending (Roza, Davis, and Guin 2007), such as those in private, charter, and district-
decentralized schools, hire larger numbers of teachers but pay lower salaries on average 
than district-run schools, where principals have no choices about whom to hire. Principals 
who have greater control over funds also focus their spending on generalist classroom 
teachers and part-time teachers and, relative to district-run schools, employ fewer 
administrators, classroom aides, and full-time specialist teachers (Hill, Roza& Harvey, 
2008). 
Districts also have a great deal of difficulty knowing where their money is spent 
or what things cost. This is true in part because districts maintain different accounting 
systems for items that are necessarily mingled together to run a school or deliver any 
instructional service. Thus, costs of salaries, benefits, facilities, technology, and private 
contracts for services are sometimes maintained in separate data systems, making it 
difficult to know the combined costs of any given resource or activity. The practice of 
keeping accounts district-wide means that it is almost impossible for district leaders to 
know exactly how much is spent on a particular school in the salary, benefits, or 
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technology accounts and therefore what is spent overall on any school (Hill, Roza& 
Harvey, 2008). 
 Both the lack of community resources and low levels of state aid may limit per-
pupil spending. The local political decision to dedicate more local resources to municipal 
services may impact educational spending as well. These lower spending districts are 
closer to a spending threshold that tends to maximize educational spending for direct 
instruction, since there are insufficient resources to spend beyond the classroom. Once 
the threshold is met, however, districts tend to spend on more peripheral purposes to meet 
community needs: employing more local residents (maintenance workers, classroom 
aides, crossing guards), providing more student support (guidance, remedial and gifted 
teachers) and adding enrichment programs (after-school activities, sports, field trips) and 
enhancing facilities (building renovations, vehicle purchases, technology upgrades) 
(Guthrie, et al, 2007).The spending beyond the threshold may meet community needs and 
provide desired programs, but may not be related to academic achievement. 
There is evidence that low-income, heavily state-subsidized school districts spend 
less efficiently than affluent school districts. As a general rule, the level of program 
operation or expansion matches the level of funds available. This matching occurs 
regardless of the theoretical “cost” of the program, that is, the minimum expenditure 
required to operate the program at a successful level. Related research on the local use of 
new money from school finance reforms has found similar patterns of resource use. Poor 
districts get more money and use it for clear needs (facilities, social services, 
compensatory education), but little of the new money makes it into the regular education 
program. The result is a system in which money rises, services expand outside the regular 
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classroom, but results in terms of student achievement stay flat or improve by only small 
amounts (Jefferson, 2005). 
By state law (R.I.G.L. 16-7-23), Rhode Island communities must fund local 
schools at the same level as the previous year. State aid must be used to support local 
education functions, and should a district end a fiscal year with a surplus, those funds are 
carried over to the next year as a fund balance. For this reason, schools have little 
incentive to spend less or in a more efficient manner since they are encouraged to spend 
at least as much as the previous year, except in cases of significant enrollment decline 
when the budget can be reduced at a proportional level to the lower number of students. 
Summary 
 Research supports a number of strategies that are associated with improved 
student performance. Under certain circumstances, reduced class size (Finn & Achilles, 
1990; Grissmer et al., 1998; Krueger, 1998) and improving the quality of the teaching 
staff (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; Goe& Stickler, 2008; Rivkin, Hanushek&Kain, 
2005) are associated with improved student performance. These actions require the 
allocation of financial resources because hiring additional teachers to decrease class size 
and increasing pay to attract quality teachers cost considerable sums. The research does 
not point to a simplistic application into an education production function 
(Normore&Ilon, 2006), but does point to focusing resources directly on the classroom. 
Increasing expenditures from local sources or from state and federal revenues are 
not reliable methods of enhancing educational outcomes. Fiscal resources may be 
necessary but insufficient for some of these changes, and most important influences must 
be created by schools working as communities of practice, preferably with the support 
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and guidance of districts, to create the most effective resources (Grubb, 2006).Districts 
that allocate larger proportions of spending to direct classroom instruction have 
demonstrated a correlation with higher student achievement (Alexander, et. al, 200; 
Odden&Picus, 2003; Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, 2003; Wenglinski, 2002). 
This prioritization may be indicative of a lower incidence of agency problems (Honing, 
2006; Loeb & McEwan, 2006).  
  
 
 
32 
 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The study examined spending and related achievement in Rhode Island public 
schools. At the macro level, total per-pupil spending was examined to determine if an 
association exists among student achievement in reading, mathematics and writing. 
Spending by district was divided into various allocation categories and compared to each 
other. 
This study explored resource allocation and the relationship between the 
categories of resources and student achievement. Drawing on a review of the literature, it 
was hypothesized that, controlling for SES, student achievement would be positively 
associated with higher spending on direct instruction and not related to resource 
allocation directed to non-classroom use such as support staff, operations and specific 
employee benefits.  
 Hypotheses 1 through 4 were tested by conducting analysis using panel data from 
Rhode Island schools from 2005 through2008. Descriptive statistics were calculated for 
all data. The intent was to test the association among school expenditure categories on 
student performancewhile controlling for observed and unobserved confounders.  
The models test the aggregated differences between the beginning and end of the 
time period of the studyof the association between spending categories and achievement 
at the school level. The assumption of independence is violated in Model 1as a result of 
multiple observations of individual schools occurring over time. Since spending and 
achievement are examined over a four yearperiod, clustered correlation exists. Correlated 
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data are common in educational and social science research. Longitudinal and 
hierarchically organized or clustered data represent two frequent analytical situations in 
which data within clusters are correlated (Ghisletta, &Spini, 2004). 
 In order to ensure valid statistical inference when some underlying regression 
model’s assumptions are violated it is common to rely on robust standard errors. The 
most common of these alternative covariance matrix estimators was developed by Huber 
(1967), and White (1980). Provided that the residuals are independently 
distributed,standard errors which are obtained by aid of this estimator are consistent even 
if the residuals are heteroscedastic. Figure 3.1 shows the independent distribution of the 
standard residuals. This analysis utilized a robust estimator in the first linear regression in 
Model 1.Multiple regression was utilized in Model 2, which tested the association 
between the within-school change in per-pupil spending categories(direct instruction, 
teacher support, therapeutic support, operations, leadership, and other expenses), and the 
within-school change in student performance. 
Table 3.1 lists the number of schools that meet the data requirements for the 
analysis for the years 2005 through 2008 for both models. 
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Table 3.1 
Rhode Island Schools Participating in NECAPwithComplete Spending Data for the 
Period 
Year Schools 
2005 231 
2006 232 
2007 278 
2008 261 
 
 The New England Common Assessment Program (NECAP) is the standardized 
assessment instrument utilized by Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont for the 
time period under study (2005 through 2008). The NECAP is a series of reading, writing, 
mathematics and science achievement tests, administered annually, and developed in 
response to the Federal No Child Left Behind Act. The NECAP tests measure students’ 
accumulated academic knowledge and skills relative to grade expectations created by 
teams of teachers representing the three states. Student scores are reported at four levels 
of academic achievement: Proficient with Distinction (level 4) Proficient (level 3), 
Partially Proficient (level 2) and Substantially Below Proficient (level 1). Reading and 
math are assessed in grades 3 to 8 and 11, and writing is assessed in grades 5, 8 and 11 
(Rhode Island Department of Education, 2010). 
 The dependent variable for all models (DV) is the percentage of students in a 
given school who meet or exceed the standard (scores of level 3 and 4) on the (NECAP) 
in reading, mathematics and writing. 
 The use of percentages as a dependent variable has limitations since it is an 
aggregate of individual student performance and limited by its scale of 0 to 100. It was 
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chosen since it is easily understood, is public information, and no comparable measure is 
readily available as an indicator of school performance.  
Data on spendingwere obtained from the Rhode Island Department of Education 
(RIDE) In$ight program. District expenditures are divided into one of five broad 
categories: Direct Instruction, Instructional Support, Operations, Other Commitments, 
and Leadership. The five function areas are composed of the activities described in Table 
3.2. The spending category definitions remained constant throughout the study period. 
Therefore any changes over time in spending represent real changes in resource 
allocations. 
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Table 3.2 
Spending Detail 
Spending category Description 
 
Direct classroom instruction Face-to-face classroom teaching 
(instructional teachers only, not including 
substitutes)  
 
Instructional support Student support: guidance services, library 
and media, student health services and 
extracurricular activities (therapeutic 
support) Teacher support: curriculum 
development, in-service and staff 
development, and sabbaticals Program 
support: management/administration, 
therapists, psychologists, evaluators, 
personal attendants, and social workers 
 
Operations Transportation, food service, safety, 
building upkeep, utilities, maintenance, and 
business services 
 
Leadership Building principal and administrative 
office staff 
 
Other commitments Contingencies, special education tuitions, 
capital projects, debt service, pass -through 
accounts, retiree benefits and legal 
obligations 
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Each category is further separated into the location of the expenditure at the school level 
(Rhode Island Department of Education, 2010). 
The independent variables (IV) for Model 1 include: 1) spending on direct 
instruction per-pupil, per-pupil expenditures allocated to classroom 
instruction,andteacher salary/benefits; 2) teacher support per-pupil, per-pupil 
expenditures allocated to support curriculum development, and in-service and staff 
development; 3) therapeutic support per pupil and diagnostic and special education 
services;4) operations per pupil, including per-pupil expenditures allocated to the cost of 
utilities, maintenance, and maintenance staff salaries; 5) leadership per pupil, including 
per-pupil expenditures allocated to the cost of the building principal and the school office 
staff; 6)other expenses per pupil, including expenditures allocated to out-of-district 
special education, post-retirement benefits for teachers (a proxy for union strength), and 
legal expenses; and 7) percentage of students in each school who receive free and 
reduced lunch(a proxy for poverty).  
The independent variables (IV) for Model 2 include: 1) annual changes in 
spending on direct instruction per pupil, including per-pupil expenditures allocated to 
classroom instruction and teacher salary/benefits; 2) annual changes in spending on 
teacher support, per pupil; 3) per-pupil expenditures allocated to therapeutic support; 4) 
annual changes in spending on operations per pupil, including  per-pupil expenditures 
allocated to the cost of utilities, maintenance, and maintenance staff salaries; 5)annual 
changes in spending on leadership per pupil, including the per-pupil cost of building 
principal and the school office staff; 6) annual changes in spending on other expenses per 
pupil, including expenditures allocated to post-retirement benefits for teachers (a proxy 
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for union strength), and legal expenses;and 7) annual changes in the percentage of 
students in each school who receive free and reduced lunch (a proxy for poverty). 
Financial and student assessment data from 2005 through 2008 were used to test 
the relationship between spending on direct instruction and student achievement in 
reading, mathematics and writing. The dependent and independent variables for Model 1 
are defined in Table 3.3, and for Model 2 in Table 3.4. The data were examined at the 
school level.  
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Table 3.3 
Description of Model 1 Variables  
Variable Specification Data source 
Dependent variables   
Student performance Proportion of students who met or 
exceeded standard on the New 
England Common Assessment 
Program in grades 3, 8, and 11 in 
Reading, ELA and Math, 2005 
through 2008 
 
RIDE 
performance 
data 
Independent variables   
Year Year of assessment RIDE 
Poverty index per school % of students who receive free and  
reduced price lunch in a school 
 
RIDE 
Direct classroom instruction 
per pupil 
Per-pupil spending allocated to 
classroom instruction, including 
teacher salary/benefits 
 
RIDE In$ight 
 Teacher support per-pupil Per-pupil expenditures allocated to 
curriculum development, in-service, 
staff development and support 
RIDE In$ight 
Therapeutic support per-
pupil  
Per-pupil expenditures allocated to 
professionals serving the needs of a 
defined program (special education) 
RIDE In$ight 
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Variable Specification Data source 
Other expenditures per-pupil Per-pupil cost of contingencies, 
special education tuitions, capital 
projects, debt service, pass-through 
accounts, retiree benefits and legal 
obligations 
 
RIDE In$ight 
Operations per-pupil Per-pupil expenditures allocated to the 
cost of maintenance, utilities, and 
maintenance staff salaries 
RIDE In$ight 
Leadership per-pupil Per-pupil spending allocated to the 
cost of building principal  and the 
school office staff 
RIDE In$ight 
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Table 3.4 
 Description of Model 2 Variables  
Variable Specification Data source 
Dependent variables   
∆Student performance Within-school change in the 
proportion of students who met or 
exceeded standard on the New 
England Common Assessment 
Program in grades 3, 8 and 11 in 
Reading, ELA and Math between 
2005 and 2008 
RIDE 
performance data 
Independent variables   
Year Year of assessment RIDE 
∆Poverty index per school 
 
Within-school change in the % of 
students who receive free and reduced 
price lunch between 2005 and 2008 
RIDE 
 ∆Direct classroom 
instruction/pupil 
Within-school change in per-pupil 
spending allocated to classroom 
instruction, including  teacher 
salary/benefits between 2005 and 
2008 
 
RIDE In$ight 
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Variable Specification Data source 
 ∆Teacher support/pupil Within-school change in per-pupil 
spending allocated to curriculum 
development, in-service, staff 
development and support between 
2005 and 2008 
RIDE In$ight 
∆Therapeutic support/pupil Within-school change in per-pupil 
spending allocated to professionals 
serving the needs of a defined 
program (special education) between 
2005 and 2008 
 
RIDE In$ight 
∆ Other expenditures/pupil Within-school change in per-pupil 
spending allocated to contingencies, 
special education tuitions, capital 
projects, debt service, pass-through 
accounts, retiree benefits and legal 
obligations between 2005 and 2008 
RIDE In$ight 
∆ Operations/pupil Within-school change in per-pupil 
spending allocated to the cost of 
maintenance, utilities, maintenance 
staff salaries between 2005 and 2008 
RIDE In$ight 
∆ Leadership/pupil Within-school change in  per-pupil 
spending allocated to the cost of 
building principal  and the school 
office staff between 2005 and 2008 
RIDE In$ight 
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Two separate model specifications were estimated to test the study hypotheses. 
Model 1 tested Hypotheses one and two. Model 2 tested Hypotheses three and four.The 
alternative specifications are two different analytic approaches to address and test the 
same hypotheses. The first pooled performance and financial data cover the period 2005 
through 2008 for reading, mathematics and writing.  This model evaluates the cross-
sectional relationship between resource use and student achievement. All student 
achievement and financial data will be modeled at the school level. The following model 
was estimated for school i at time t: 
Model 1 Equation 
Performance it = b0 + b1 year t + b2 % students receiving free and reduced price lunch it 
+ b3  per pupil spending on direct instruction it + b4 per pupil spending on 
teacher support  it + b5 per pupil spending on therapeutic support it + b6per 
pupil spending on operationsit + b7  spending per pupil on other expenses it 
+ b8 per pupil spending on leadership+ e it 
 
Performance is the percentage of students that met or exceeded the standard on 
the New England Common Assessment Program. The model estimated separately for 
reading, math, and writing performance. In this equation, Year is the variable for the year 
of test administration (capturing trends in student achievement), % students receiving free 
and reduced price lunch is a proxy for SES, spending variables (direct instruction, 
teacher support, therapeutic support, operations, leadership, and other expenditures) are 
the per-pupil cost of spending for given spending categories.  
 It was hypothesized that b3, the relationship between spending on direct 
instruction and performance,would  be statistically significant in a positive direction, 
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while the coefficients on the spending variables of pupil support, operations, leadership, 
and other expenditures would be either non-significant or significant in a negative 
direction. 
 While the first model tested the relationship between resource use and student 
achievement, it omits a number of unmeasured variables that affect student performance. 
These include teacher quality, parental support, individual student ability, and school 
climate, all of which can contribute to school effectiveness but are not readily 
measureable on a financial basis. To address the potential confounding from these 
omitted factors, a second, longitudinal model was estimated. This model was based on 
the assumption that the unmeasured factors omitted from the first specification are largely 
constant within schools over time. Therefore, by subtracting variable values within 
schools across adjacent periods, the unmeasured variables would be effectively canceled 
out, decreasing confounding and allowing for better estimates of the association between 
resource use and student achievement. The following model was estimated for school i, 
in time twhere all variables are defined as before and ∆ indicates the change in a variable 
between a given year and the previous year: 
Model 2 Equation 
∆Performance it = b0 + b1 year t + b2 ∆% students receiving free and reduced 
price lunch it + b3  ∆ per pupil spending on direct instruction it + b4 ∆per pupil 
spending on teacher support  it + b5 ∆ per pupil spending on therapeutic support 
it+ b6 ∆ per pupil spending on operationsit + b7  ∆ spending per pupil on other 
expenses it + b8 ∆ per pupil spending on leadershipit+eit 
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This captures changes in performance due to outside factors. This model 
controlled for a number of factors, including teacher quality, which may confound the 
relationship between spending and achievement.  
By accounting for unobserved confounders and by estimating the model in 
changes, it was expected that b3, the association between the within-school change in per-
pupil spending on direct instruction and the within-school change in student performance 
would be smaller than the association observed in Model 1.  This is because of an 
expected number of important unmeasured factors (e.g. teacher and administrator quality, 
parental and community incentive to perform) to be positively correlated with both 
spending on direct instruction and student performance. By estimating the model in 
changes, these unmeasured factors would be accounted for, and by doing so it was 
reasonable to expect a smaller effect of spending on direct student instruction on student 
performance.  
The second model examined the change of the variables. Should the model reveal 
non-significant results, it would be difficult to conclude whether the factors were 
insignificant or if the model lacked the power to detect them. For this reason the changes 
were tested over the four year period. 
All analyses used an alpha level of .05 to determine statistical significance. 
Evaluation of Regression Assumptions 
 The assumptions of regression were tested through the examination of residuals. 
First, the standardized residuals were examined for departures from normality. If 
residuals are normally distributed, approximately 5% of the cases are expected to be 
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beyond plus or minus two standard deviations. The prevalence of outliers was evaluated 
by calculating the proportion of standardized residuals with values between 1.96 and -
1.96.  In Model 1, given the sample size of 1002, approximately 50 cases would be 
expected to have standardized residual values that fall outside this range. Figure 3.1 
shows the histogram of the standardized residual. Appendix Ashows the casewise 
diagnostics. For the dependent variable reading, six standardized residuals have absolute 
values greater than 1.96, for the dependent variable math, 14, and for writing, four. This 
analysis indicates that fewer residuals are falling in the tails of the distribution than would 
be expected by chance alone, suggesting that outliers are not having a substantial 
influence on the results. Figure 3.2 also shows that the residuals for each of the dependent 
variables in Model 2 are distributed approximately normal. 
The homoscedasticity assumption was tested by evaluating the correlation of 
residuals within schools across the four-year study period. To do this, an ANOVA was 
performed (Table 3.6), where the standardized residual was the outcome and the school 
indicator was the factor variable. This analysis found that the school factor was a 
significant predictor of the residuals, indicating the clustering of errors within schools in 
Model 1 (F= 5.42 (277, 695), p<.05).  
Testing the homoscedasticity assumption was performed for Model 2 using the 
Breusch-Pagan test. After differencing between years 4 and 1 of the panel, the Model 2 
included only one observation from each school, making the Breusch-Pagan test 
appropriate for the cross-sectional data (White, 1980). The Breusch-Pagan test rejected 
the assumption of homoscedasticity for reading (the probability of constant variance was 
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.03) and math (the probability of constant variance was .0042) but not for writing (the 
probability of constant variance was .668). 
The aggregate data in Model 1 meets all the assumptions except for the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. Thus the assumption of independence is violated and 
multiple regression cannot be utilized in Model 1. Instead, a generalized linear model is 
estimated which calculates cluster-robust standard errors, based on the assumption that 
errors are non-independent within schools, but independent across schools. 
 The assumption of independence is violated in Model 1as a result of multiple 
observations of individual schools occurring over time. Since spending and achievement 
are examined over a four-year period, clustered correlation exists. Correlated data are 
common in educational and social science research. Longitudinal and hierarchically 
organized or clustered data represent two frequent analytical situations in which data 
within clusters are correlated (Ghisletta, &Spini, 2004).  
 In order to ensure valid statistical inference when some underlying regression 
model’s assumptions are violated it is common to rely on “robust” standard errors. The 
most common of these alternative covariance matrix estimators has been developed by 
Huber (1967), and White (1980). Provided that the residuals are independently 
distributed, standard errors that are obtained by aid of this estimator are consistent even if 
the residuals are heteroscedastic. Figure 3.1 shows the independent distribution of the 
standard residuals. This analysis utilized a robust estimator in the first linear regression 
model.  
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To address the violation to the homoscedasticity assumption in Model 1, a 
generalized linear model was estimated which calculated cluster-robust standard errors, 
based on the assumption that errors are non-independent within schools, but independent 
across schools. In Model 2, a generalized linear model using heteroscedasticitiy-
consistent standard errors (Huber 1980) was estimated to appropriately calculate standard 
errors given the violation of the homoscedasticity assumption for two of the three 
dependent variables.  
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Table 3.5 
ANOVA Standardized Residuals Outcome (School is the Factor)in Model 1 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Between Groups 659.83 277 2.38 5.42 .000 
Within Groups 305.16 695 .43   
Total 965.00 972    
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Figure 3.1 
Histogram of Model 1 Variables 
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Figure 3.2 
Histogram of Model 2 Variables 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The central question in this study was whether there exists an association between 
spending allocations and student achievement. The study was guided by two Research 
Questions: 
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between spending on public 
education in Rhode Island and student achievement? 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between annual changes in 
spending on public education in Rhode Island and annual changes in student 
achievement? 
These Research Questions were further focused by four Research Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher per-pupil spending on direct instruction at the school level 
is associated with higher student reading, math, and writing performance.  
Hypothesis 2: Higher per-pupil spending on instructional support, operations, 
leadership and other commitments at the school level are not associated with 
higher student reading, math, and writing performance.  
Hypothesis3: School-level changes in per-pupil spending on direct instruction are 
associated with changes in student reading, math, and writing performance. 
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Hypothesis 4: School-level changes in per-pupil spending on instructional 
support, operations, leadership and other commitments are not associated with 
changes in student reading, math, and writing performance. 
This section first displays results from descriptive analysis of spending and 
student achievement in Rhode Island from 2005-2008. It then shows the results from two 
separate multivariate model specifications test the relationship between spending and 
student achievement. 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.1 shows the means and standard deviations of the percentage of students 
who met or exceeded standard in reading, math, and writing on the NECAP assessment 
and spending by expenditure category (instructional teachers, teacher support, student 
therapeutic support, operations, other expenditures, leadership, and the proportion of 
students receiving free and reduced price lunch. The sample size (n=1002) represents 
data points for all the public schools in Rhode Island with complete data for the period. 
Table 4.1 shows that the mean school-level rate of meeting the NECAP standard in 
Rhode Island was approximately 65% for reading, 53% for math, and 51% for writing 
between 2005 and 2008. Reading performance increased steadily throughout the study 
period while math and writing scores remained relatively unchanged. Table 4.1 also 
shows that the largest school expenditures were for instructional teaching ($7140 per 
pupil in 2008), followed by spending on therapeutic support ($1201 per pupil in 2008), 
operations ($1084 per pupil in 2008), other expenses ($885 per pupil in 2008), teacher 
support ($770 per pupil in 2008), and leadership ($686 per pupil in 2008). The large 
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standard deviations for instructional teaching, and particularly for therapeutic support, 
indicate a great degree of variation in spending patterns across schools.  Each spending 
category increased over the study period while the proportion of students receiving free 
and reduced priced lunch was stable. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Model for Reading, Math and Writing, 
2005 through 2008 
 
 
Variable 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Percent that met or 
exceeded standard on 
NECAP Reading 
61.50 18.61 65.08 17.58 65.56 17.51 68.98 15.76 
Percent that met or 
exceeded standard on 
NECAP Math 
53.03 19.13 56.32 18.25 50.71 22.64 53.87 22.31 
Percent that met or 
exceeded standard on 
NECAP Writing 
54.24 17.62 48.78 20.45 48.40 19.64 53.03 19.17 
Instructional teaching 
per pupil 
6003 1490 6404 1903 6781 1630 7140 1696 
Teacher support per 
pupil 
586 288 643 310 743 361 770 375 
Therapeutic support 
per pupil 
889 1739 1148 1962 1106 2065 1201 1398 
Operations per pupil 888 353 1005 712 1021 390 1084 494 
Other expense per 
pupil 
808 490 854 531 868 497 885 515 
Leadership per pupil 603 293 659 338 690 360 686 265 
Free and reduced 
lunch 
34.69 30.32 35.07 30.31 33.67 27.42 33.44 26.49 
Sample size: 2005 n=231; 2006 n=232; 2007 n = 278; 2008 n=261 
Sample sizes are reduced due to missing writing data for some schools 
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Table 4.2 shows the means and standard deviations of the differences of 
expenditure category (instructional teachers, teacher support, student therapeutic support, 
operations, other expenditures, leadership, and the proportion of students receiving free 
and reduced price lunch) between the base yearof 2005 and 2008, the last year of the 
study period. The sample size (n=215) represents the differences between 2005 and 2008 
of all the public schools in Rhode Island with complete data for the period. Table 4.2 
shows that the mean difference in school-level rate of meeting the NECAP standard in 
Rhode Island was approximately 8.31 % for reading, 7.28 % for math, and 2.19 % for 
writing between 2005 and 2008. Table 4.2 also shows that the largest increase in school 
expenditures was for instructional teaching ($1264 per pupil), followed by spending on 
therapeutic support ($393 per pupil), operations ($193 per pupil), teacher support ($118 
per pupil), other expenses ($95 per pupil), and leadership ($91 per pupil). The large 
standard deviations for instructional teaching and the other spending categories, 
particularly for therapeutic support, indicate a great degree of variation in spending 
patterns across schools. 
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Table 4.2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Model 2 for the Differences in Reading, 
Math and Writing between the Years 2005 and 2008 
 
Variable 
 
Mean SD 
Percent that met or exceeded standard on 
NECAP Reading  
8.31 7.58 
Percent that met or exceeded standard on 
NECAP Math 
7.28 9.22 
Percent that met or exceeded standard on 
NECAP Reading Writing 
2.19 13.68 
Change in spending: Instruction/teaching 
per pupil 
$1264 $1329 
Change in spending:Teachersupport per 
pupil 
$118 $172 
Change in spending:Therapeutic support 
per pupil 
$393 $759 
Change in spending:Operations per pupil $193 $368 
Change in spending:Other expense per 
pupil 
$95 $292 
Change in spending:Leadership per pupil $91 $204 
Change in spending:Free and reduced 
lunch 
-.86 9.43 
 
Sample size = 215 
 
Model 1 Analysis 
 Model 1 pools school-level observations from 2005 through 2008 and usesa 
generalized linear model to account for the non-independence of observationsto estimate 
the relationship between the spending categories and achievement for reading, writing, 
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and math. In all models, the spending categories are in units of $1000 per pupil. 
Therefore, model coefficient values are interpreted as the effect of increased per-pupil 
spending by $1000 with the change in the proportion of schools that meet or exceed 
standard on NECAP reading, mathematics and writing assessments. 
Reading 
 Table 4.3 shows the summary of the Model 1 analysis for reading. The 
relationship between the dependent variable (reading) and the independent variables 
instructional teaching, therapeutic support, the percentage of students receiving free and 
reduced price lunch, and the year is significant (F (10, 279) = 171.47, p < .05). The effect 
size (R
2
= .76) shows that 76% of the variation in reading scores can be explained by the 
model. There are 1002 total observations. The standard error is adjusted for 280 schools 
over the four-year period. 
 Table 4.3 shows the associations between the dependent variable, reading and the 
independent variables. Of the spending categories, instructional teaching is positively 
associated with reading achievement. Based on the model, an expenditure of $1000 
would increase the number of students in reading proficiency by 1.75 percentage points. 
The therapeutic support is negatively associated with reading gains. The model predicts 
that allocations decrease the percentage of students reaching proficiency by 2.16 for each 
$1000 allocated to this expense. 
 The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is negatively 
associated with reading performance. The model predicts that for each one percentage 
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point increase by students in this category, reading performance will decline .49 
percentage points.    
 The testing year is also significantly and positively associated with reading scores 
indicating an upward trend in reading performance that was unexplained by the other 
model variables. These factors could be greater teacher emphasis on student performance, 
increased test preparation and skill development, greater community awareness regarding 
the importance of the assessments, and higher parental expectations. 
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Table 4.3 
Summary of Model 1 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Reading 
Achievement  
2005-2008 (n = 1002, S.E. Adjusted for 280 Clusters by School) 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
Spending on Instructional teachers per 
pupil in thousands of dollars 
1.75* .41 
Spending on Teacher support per pupilin 
thousands of dollars 
-2.32 1.49 
Spending on Therapeutic support per 
pupilin thousands of dollars 
-2.16* .26 
Spending on Operations expense per 
pupilin thousands of dollars 
-1.71 1.15 
Spending on Leadership expense per 
pupilin thousands of dollars 
-2.77 1.61 
Spending on Other expenses per pupilin 
thousands of dollars 
-.95 .62 
Proportion of students receiving free and 
reduced price lunch 
-.49* .01 
Year 2006 4.15* .42 
Year 2007 3.54* .68 
Year 2008 6.60* .71 
R
2 
= .76 
*p < .05 
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Math 
 Table 4.4 shows the summary of the Model 1 analysis for math. The relationship 
between the dependent variable (math) and the independent variables, including 
instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the percentage of students 
receiving free and reduced price lunch and the first year of testing are significant (F (10, 
279) = 84.95, p < .05). The effect size (R
2
 = .55) shows that 55% of the variation in 
reading scores can be explained by the model. There are 1002 total observations. The 
standard error is adjusted for 280 schools over the four-year period. 
 Table 4.4 shows the associations between the dependent variable, math and the 
independent variables. Of the spending categories, instructional teaching is positively 
associated with math achievement. Based on the model, an expenditure of $1000 would 
increase the number of students achieving math proficiency by 3.03 percentage points. 
Teacher and therapeutic support are negatively associated with math performance. The 
model predicts that as allocations are increased, the percentage of students reaching 
proficiency decreases by 14.99 percentage points for teacher support and 2.78 for 
therapeutic support for each $1000 allocated. 
 The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is negatively 
associated with math performance. The model predicts that for each one percentage point 
increase by students in this category, math performance will decline .48 percentage 
points.    
 The 2006 testing year is also significantly associated with math growth indicating 
that factors not included in the analysis had an impact on student performance on the 
NECAP. This could indicate the trend toward higher scores as teachers place more 
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emphasis on student performance and increase test preparation and skill development. 
However, scores dropped in 2007 and increased only slightly in 2008, although these 
results were not significant. This one year rise may be indicative of better test preparation 
that occurred in the second year of the period but leveled off in following years. 
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Table 4.4 
Summary of Model 1 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Math 
Achievement  
2005 through 2008 (n = 1002, S.E. Adjusted for 280 Clusters by School) 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
Spending on Instructional teachers per 
pupil in thousands of dollars 
3.03* .72 
Spending on Teacher support per pupilin 
thousands of dollars 
-14.99* 3.02 
Spending on Therapeutic support per pupil 
in thousands of dollars 
-2.78* .60 
Spending on Operations expense per pupil 
in thousands of dollars 
-3.06 1.75 
Spending on Leadership expense per pupil 
in thousands of dollarsin thousands of 
dollars 
-2.56 2.30 
Spending on Other expense per pupil in 
thousands of dollars 
-.01 1.03 
Proportion of students receiving free and 
reduced lunch 
-.48* .02 
Year 2006 4.33* .53 
Year 2007 -1.58 1.08 
Year 2008 1.22 1.29 
R
2
 = .56 
*(p < .05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Writing 
 Table 4.5 shows the summary of the Model 1 analysis for writing. The 
relationship between the dependent variable (writing) and the independent 
variablesincluding:instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the 
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch, and the first year of testing 
are significant (F (10, 260) = 51.70, p < .05). The effect size (R
2
 = .46) shows that 46% 
of the variation in reading scores can be explained by the model. There are 908 total 
observations. The standard error is adjusted for 261 schools over the four-year period. 
 Table 4.5 shows the associations between the dependent variable, math, and the 
independent variables. Of the spending categories, instructional teaching is positively 
associated with writing achievement. Based on the model, $1000 in expenditures would 
increase the number of students achieving math proficiency by 2.71 percentage points. 
Teacher and therapeutic support for are negatively associated with writing performance. 
The model predicts that allocations decrease the percentage of students reaching 
proficiency by 11.25 percentage points for teacher support and 2.33 for therapeutic 
support for each $1000 allocated. 
 The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is negatively 
associated with writing performance. The model predicts that for each one percentage 
point increase by students in this category, writing performance will decline .39 
percentage points.    
 The first two testing years are also significantly and negatively associated 
negative writing scores, indicating that factors not included in the analysis had an impact 
on student performance on the NECAP. 
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Table 4.5 
Summary of Model 1 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Writing 
Achievement  
2005-2008 (n = 908, S.E. Adjusted for 261 Clusters by School) 
 
Variable B SE B 
Spending on instructional teachers per 
pupil in thousands of dollars 
2.71* .69 
Spending on teacher support per pupil 
in thousands of dollars 
-11.25* 1.94 
Spending on therapeutic support per pupil 
in thousands of dollars 
-2.33* .41 
Spending on operations expense per pupil 
in thousands of dollars 
-2.84 1.72 
Spending on leadership expense per pupil 
in thousands of dollars 
-4.94* 1.93 
Spending on other expense per pupilin 
thousands of dollars 
-.39 1.29 
Proportion of students receiving free and 
reduced lunch 
-.39* .02 
Year 2006 -4.45* 1.08 
Year 2007 -5.64* 1.20 
Year 2008 -1.36 1.24 
R
2
 = .46 
*(p < .05) 
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Model 2 Summary  
Reading 
Table 4.6 shows the summary of the Model 2 analysis for changes in reading and 
the independent variables instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the 
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch between 2005 and 2008. 
The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is significant (F (7, 
216) = 8.39), p < .05).The effect size (R
2
 = .03) shows that 3% of the variation in the 
change in reading scores can be explained by the model. There are 217 total observations. 
 The change in students receiving free and reduced priced lunch is the only 
predictor of change in reading achievement. The percentage of students receiving free 
and reduced price lunch is negatively associated with change in reading performance. 
The model predicts that for each one percentage point increase by students in this 
category, reading performance will decline .29 percentage points.    
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Table 4.6 
 Model 2 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Changes in Reading 
Achievement (2008 values minus 2005 values) 
 (n = 217) 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
Change in instructional teachers per pupil 
 
-.21 1.69 
Change in teacher support per pupil 
 
-4.91 11.26 
Change in therapeutic support per pupil 
 
2.18 1.16 
Change in operations expense per pupil 
 
2.76 6.35 
Change in leadership expense per pupil 
 
-.07 3.90 
Change in other expense per pupil 
 
-6.62 8.89 
Change in the proportion of students 
receiving free and reduced price lunch 
 
-.29* .13 
R
2
 = .03 
*(p < .05) 
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Table 4.7 shows the summary of the Model 2 analysis for changes in math 
performance. The relationship between the dependent variable (the difference in math 
performance between year 4 and year 1) and the corresponding changes of the 
independent variables instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the 
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch and the first year of testing 
are significant (F (5, 214) = 2.78), p < .05). The effect size (R
2
 = .03) shows that 3% of 
the variation in the change in math scores can be explained by the model. There are 215 
total observations. 
 None of the independent variables are associated with the differences in math 
performance between year 4 (2008) and year 1 (2005). 
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Table 4.7 
Model 2 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Changes in Math 
Achievement (2008 values minus 2005 values) 
(n = 215) 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
Change in instructional teachers per pupil 
 
.06 .45 
Change in teacher support per pupil 
 
2.52 2.67 
Change in therapeutic support per pupil 
 
1.38 .81 
Change in operations expense per pupil 
 
2.06 6.15 
Change in leadership expense per pupil 
 
-1.69 3.23 
Change in other expense per pupil 
 
2.622 2.89 
Change in the proportion of students 
receiving free and reduced price lunch 
 
-.13 .07 
R
2
 = .03  
*(p < .05) 
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Writing 
 
Table 4.8 shows the summary of the Model 2 analysis for changes in writing 
performance. The relationship between the dependent variable (the difference in writing 
performance between year 4 and year 1) and the corresponding changes of the 
independent variables instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the 
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch, and the first year of testing 
are significant (F (5, 191) = 5.32), p < .05). The effect size (R
2
 = .02) shows that 2% of 
the variation in the change in writing scores can be explained by the model. There are 
192 total observations. 
 None of the independent variables are associated with the differences in writing 
performance between year 4 (2008) and year 1 (2005). 
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Table 4.8 
 Model 2 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Changes in Writing 
Achievement  
(2008 values minus 2005 values) 
(n = 192) 
 
Variable 
 
B SE B 
Change in instructional teachers per pupil 
 
-1.05 .72 
Change in teacher support per pupil 
 
-.93 6.57 
Change in therapeutic support per pupil 
 
-2.70 3.92 
Change in operations expense per pupil 
 
2.26 3.35 
Change in leadership expense per pupil 
 
1.91 3.72 
Change in other expense per pupil 
 
2.62 4.56 
Change in the proportion of students 
receiving free and reduced price lunch 
 
.10 .20 
R
2
 = .02 
*(p < .05) 
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Summary  
These results indicate that Hypothesis 1: Higher per-pupil spending on direct 
instruction at the school level is associated with higher student reading, math, and writing 
performance was supported by the positive associations determined by Model 1 analysis. 
These results indicate that Hypothesis 2: Higher per-pupil spending on 
instructional support, operations, leadership and other commitments at the school level 
are not associated with higher student reading, math, and writing performance was 
supported by the negative associations determined by Model 1 analysis.  
These results indicate that Hypothesis 3: School-level changes in per-pupil 
spending on direct instruction are associated with changes in student reading, math, and 
writing performance was not supported due to the absence of statistically significant 
associations as determined by Model 2 analysis. 
These results indicate that Hypothesis 4: School-level changes in per-pupil 
spending on instructional support, operations, leadership and other commitments are not 
associated with changes in student reading, math, and writing performance was not 
supported due to the absence of statistically significant associations as determined by 
Model 2 analysis. 
Limitations 
 There were a number of limitations to the study. In the case of the dependent 
variable, the effects of schooling were not limited solely to test results, which at best, 
represented a composite assessment of the knowledge and skills acquired by the student 
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at a particular point in time. Standardized assessments are not the only measure of school 
effectiveness. Schools have many goals, including social, developmental, and academic.  
The use of percentages as a dependent variable has limitations since it is an 
aggregate of individual student performance and limited by its scale of 0 to 100. It was 
chosen because it is easily understood, was public information, and no comparable 
measure was readily available as an indicator of school performance. 
The In$ight spending data covered broad spending categories which does not 
allow for more fine grained assessment of spending detail. For this reason, it was 
abandoned by RIDE in favor of the Uniform Chart of Accounts (UCOA). School level 
UCOA was not available until after 2008, the end period of the study. Nonetheless, the 
In$ight data provides important information on school spending choices throughout the 
study period which allowed for the assessment of how these broad patters of spending 
were related to school achievement. 
The results are limited to the school level and do not evaluate within-school 
differences and the effect of spending on achievement. The results may not be 
generalizable to other states. 
Other limitations emerged specifically in Model 2. Model 1 pooled school data 
from 2004-2008 but did not measure student characteristics or teacher quality and 
interpretation of the model may be biased by unobserved confounders. Thus Model 2 was 
needed. It assumed teacher quality and student characteristics were constant over the 
study period and cancelled them out therefore allowing the model to analyze the effect of 
resources on achievement. The model used multiple regression differencing methods but 
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the results identified no statistically significant association between resource allocation 
and student performance. 
 One limitation from Model 2 is that if unobserved characteristics were not 
constant within schools over time, and that these characteristics were related to spending 
categories, then the model would yield biased coefficient estimates. Future research that 
better assessed school and student characteristics could potentially address this situation. 
For instance teacher quality and other independent variables strongly associated with 
student performance (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; Rivkin, Hanushek&Kain, 2005; 
Wenglinsky, 2002)might have been included in the model to better estimate the 
relationship between spending and achievement.RIDE data on teacher practice, 
experience, and certification might have also identified a relationship between human 
resource allocation and achievement. 
 Future research should therefore focus on identifying and measuring other 
important school and student characteristics that could confound the relationship between 
spending and achievement. This could result in a third model that explored the 
association between resource allocation and teacher performance as determined by 
evaluation results and a richer set of control variables. 
Finally, other modeling techniques, making different assumptions about the 
correlation of observations within schools, could have been employed in the study. To 
address the clustering of observations within schools, Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
(HLM) might have been utilized to estimate school-level parameters and variance 
estimates. 
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Strengths 
 Strengths of the analyses include the fact that the study: 
1. Utilized a large sample size of pooled data over time 
2. Included easily understood public data; and 
3. Addressed the current RIDE agenda by linking the output-based Basic Education 
Plan, the newly adopted funding formula, and the uniform chart of accounts 
(UCOA) 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study evaluated the relationship between school spending and achievement 
in Rhode Island between 2005 and 2008. It was not unexpected to see differences in 
achievement levels related to family income and community of residence. In this study, 
student eligibility for free and reduced price lunch was used as a proxy for student 
poverty. The mean percentage of this for the state is 35%, but in the urban communities, 
the percentage is much higher. In Central Falls, 85.2% of the students qualify, followed 
by Providence (78%), Pawtucket (64%), Woonsocket (63.9%) and Newport (51.3%). In 
more affluent rural and suburban communities, the situation is reversed:  3.2% of 
Barrington students qualify followed by East Greenwich (4.9%), Portsmouth (6.8%), 
Scituate (7.0%), Little Compton (7.0%), and Jamestown (7.1%). 
Schools in wealthy suburban communities such as Barrington and East 
Greenwich,may see 90% of their students meet or exceed standard on reading 
assessments, while in the poorer, urban cities of Providence and Central Falls, the success 
rate may be in the 30% range. Math performance can even be worse, where in some 
schools, less than 10% of the student population meets standard. The mean state 
achievement levels in reading (65.20), math (53.09) and writing (51.02) may not be 
surprising, but the variations in scores as evidenced by the standard deviations are a cause 
for concern: reading (17.53), math (20.92) and writing (19.41) show a state where 
between 82.73 and 47.67 of the students meet or exceed standard in reading, which 
contains 68.2% (one standard deviation) of the students. In math, 68.2% of the students 
fall between 74.01 and 32.17, and in writing, 70.43 and 31.61. These data indicates 
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significant achievement gaps between districts in the state. These gaps are closely 
associated with family income and the effects of poverty and confirmed by extensive 
research (Coleman et. al., 1966, Reynolds & Walberg, 1992; Sirin, 2005;Wenglinsky, 
1998). 
In addition to the achievement gaps, are the wide variations in spending patterns 
found across schools. In terms of total spending for the period of study, the state mean 
was $12371 per pupil. Some small districts such as New Shorham (Block Island) 
($24,083), Jamestown ($16744) and Little Compton ($16099) spend far more due to their 
lack of economies of scale or high school tuition and transportation costs (Little Compton 
and Jamestown have K – 8 programs and tuition their high school students to neighboring 
communities). Yet there are major differences between more similar communities. For 
the period of the study, Narragansett spent $14,947 per pupil, Gloucester $14,187, Foster, 
$14,166 and South Kingston $14,058, while Cumberland spent $9,720, Barrington 
$9,909 and Portsmouth $10,305. 
Of the urban communities, Newport exceeds the state mean by spending $13,790 
per pupil, Central Falls $13,463, and Providence $13,141. Woonsocket spends $2,301 
below the state mean at $10,070 per pupil. Pawtucket also is below the state mean at 
$11,630.  
The study focused on how the total per-pupil spending was allocated. Results 
from multiple regression indicated that spending on classroom instructional teaching 
tended to be associated with higher reading, writing, and math achievement, as measured 
by the NECAP exam. However, spending, on therapeutic support (primarily special 
education services), teacher support, operations, and other expenditures (including post-
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retirement benefits and out-of-district special education placements) were either 
negatively associated with student achievement, or had no statistically significant 
association. By using school-level data from all Rhode Island elementary, middle, and 
high schools in the state, the study provides a comprehensive analysis of spending and 
achievement over the period.  
The relationship between spending and achievement varied across the two model 
specifications that were estimated. In Model 1 pooled school-level observations were 
shown across years of data from 2005 through 2008. However, Model 1 results did not 
demonstrate whether this association was causal or related to how effective schools use 
their resources. It implied that simply placing more resources in the form of higher 
salaries and costly benefits for classroom teachers will not, in and of itself, improve 
student performance. The aggregate model did not measure teacher quality. However, it 
may be inferred that allocations to activities negatively or not associated with student 
performance (teacher support, therapeutic support, operations and leadership) divert 
resources away from classroom instruction, the one activity associated with student 
achievement.  
Model 2 evaluated whether the difference in spending on various categories 
between years was associated with the difference in achievement between years. The 
model did not find an association between spending and achievement. By holding 
unobserved time-invariant factors (e.g. teacher quality) constant, this model was an 
attempt to better identify the association relationship between spending and achievement. 
It was anticipated that results from this model might highlight questions as to whether 
any specific pattern of spending, by itself, could improve student 
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achievement.Nonetheless, results from both models indicate that most forms of spending 
are not positively associated with student achievement which highlights likely 
inefficiency in spending across the state.  
While the study was conducted at the school level, it is instructive to see the 
differences of spending priorities that take place at the district level. Table 5.1 compared 
the total per-pupil spending by districts with the amount allocated to instructional 
teaching. Most of the districts in the state are at or near the state mean with 53% of their 
per-pupil allocations dedicated to instructional teaching. Coventry (63.4%), Barrington 
(60%) and North Smithfield (60%) dedicated the highest proportion, and Woonsocket is 
the urban community with the highest ratio of 58.6%. 
The only district of size which is considerably below the mean is Providence, at 
45.4%. While allocating a low proportion to direct instruction, the district exceeds the 
state average in spending for therapeutic support, operations, leadership and other 
expenditures. Consequently, this study raises the question as to whether student 
performance in Providence is being held back by poor resource allocation. 
School budgets include statutory expenditures. By law and regulation, facilities 
must be constructed and maintained, certification laws must be followed, and special 
education services must be provided. The allocations to teacher support, therapeutic 
support, operations and leadership are necessary, systemic expenditures, but must be 
evaluated carefully in light of the model results. It is not known whether these allocations 
are causal or the result of inefficient use, or influenced by other variables not included in 
the model. For example, effective school leadership has been shown to positively impact 
student achievement. It is unknown from the study results, however, whether ineffective 
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leadership is counterbalancing effective practicesor if a disproportionate level of 
spending is occurring for the function. 
The cross sectional analysis in Model 1 shows a consistent relationship among  
the spending categories, both positive and negative, and reading, math and writing 
performance. The inconclusive results in the differencing Model 2 indicates that the 
association may not hold over time. To the extent this study can inform, most forms of 
spending do not appear to influence student performance. The one area that shows a 
positive relationship is the allocation to direct classroom instruction.The results of this 
study support earlier research that shows high performing district allocate a higher 
percentage of their resources to classroom instruction than their lower performing 
counterparts (Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, 2003). 
Conversely, therapeutic support was negatively associated with reading, math and 
writing, and teacher support was negatively associated with math and writing. The 
negative association of therapeutic support may be attributed to selection bias. A large 
portion of these expenditures is for special education services. The students who receive 
special education are less likely to achieve proficiency due to the nature of their 
individual education plans (Alexander,  Boyer, Brownson, Jennings, & Patrick, 2000). 
The negative association of teacher support is of more interest. The expenditures 
for guidance, remedial staff and nurses, in theory, support students in order that they may 
be better prepared to achieve at higher levels. For example, to address the problem of low 
reading performance, the Rhode Island Board of Elementary and Secondary Education 
enacted regulation requiring districts to hire certified reading teachers to oversee personal 
reading plans (PLP) for underperforming students. Based on this study, it might have 
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been more effective to conduct staff development for classroom teachers who are 
positively associated with reading performance. Odden&Picus(2004) and 
Wenglinski(2002) found that these forms of expenditures, along with school operations 
and administration, were not associated with improved performance. 
The study has implications for state-aid funding policy. The State of Rode Island 
adopted a funding formula in 2010 after two decades of level funding with percentage 
increases, regardless of enrollment, district performance, or budget allocation. The 
formula is based on enrollment, the community’s ability to raise revenue for education, 
and weighted student need accounting for family income. The formula attempts to 
provide an equitable and adequate funding stream based on a “market-basket” of 
expenditures (teacher salary and benefits, guidance, operations, leadership, etc.). The 
formula does not dictate how resources are to be allocated. 
The Uniform Chart of Accounts (UCOA) is a more detailed accounting than the 
In$ight program utilized in this study. By publicizing student test scores, funding, and 
UCOA data, RIDE makes the assumption that the public school committees and district 
administrations will make comparisons between neighboring or comparable districts and 
adjust resources accordingly. 
The Rhode Island Basic Education Plan (BEP), developed in 1989, was based on 
the principle that given an acceptable level of inputs, such as staff, access to standard 
courses, libraries, textbooks, extra-curricular activities, students in the State would have 
the same opportunity to learn. The new BEP, adopted in 2010, is outcome-based. It asks 
whether students are meeting proficiency and graduating. Past disputes between a school 
district and their funding authorities centered on the input data of the old BEP. A 
 
 
83 
 
municipality might be ordered by the Court for example, to provide additional funds to 
offer French and Spanish as high school courses, or hire an additional librarian based on 
student enrollment. Under the new BEP, monetary disputes are more complex. A district 
must show that revenue is needed to improve student performance. This study will 
provide additional information regarding the effect on achievement that specific 
allocations have, and allow districts to prioritize their resources accordingly. Since there 
is a positive association between resources allocated to direct classroom instruction and 
student achievement, policy decisions that create funding streams diverted to other areas 
may be counter-productive. 
Future research on the relationship between funding and achievement might 
consider more detailed examination of spending as independent variables as well as 
student growth as the dependent variable. By focusing by the growth patterns of 
individual student performance, better understanding could be gained as to how resources 
can affect the nature of instruction. 
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Table 5.1 
Spending Allocation Means (expenditures per pupil)Rhode Island Districts, 2004-2008 
District Instructional 
Teachers 
 ($) 
Teacher 
Support 
($) 
Therapeutic 
Support  
($) 
Operations  
 
($) 
Other 
Expenditures 
($) 
Leadership  
 
($) 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch  
(%) 
State 6604 697 1041 1005 852 656 37.1 
Barrington 5946 716 327 856 516 409 3.2 
Burriville 6163 628 629 1013 693 567 25.5 
Bristol-
Warren 
6699 694 815 976 1155 717 22.9 
Central Falls 7009 1043 1241 893 1194 667 85.2 
Chariho 6663 630 787 966 1132 720 23.3 
Coventry 6529 460 536 768 140 519 15.9 
Cumberland 5381 625 951 836 600 431 17.9 
E.Greenwich 6340 957 940 1221 387 861 4.9 
E.Providence 6270 616 1191 835 1174 633 40.1 
Exeter West 
Greenwich 
6929 969 744 883 867 819 10.6 
Foster 7269 660 843 945 206 522 14.2 
Gloucester 6993 526 1603 949 427 568 13.5 
Jamestown 8003 682 809 992 4379 617 7.1 
Johnston 7179 558 1232 782 1575 632 21.1 
Lincoln 7147 727 583 1022 478 589 13.9 
Little 
Compton 
7742 690 316 1267 3422 621 7.0 
Middletown 7804 911 449 1312 995 616 16.2 
Narragansett 8003 1362 1027 1255 546 959 9.6 
Newport 7187 1302 1022 1074 1025 789 51.3 
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District Instructional 
Teachers 
 ($) 
Teacher 
Support 
($) 
Therapeutic 
Support  
($) 
Operations  
 
($) 
Other 
Expenditures 
($) 
Leadership  
 
($) 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch  
(%) 
N. Shorham 15486 442 751 2576 0 2445 8.4 
North 
Kingstown 
6011 784 1002 989 830 602 13.6 
North 
Providence 
7396 848 1073 989 833 714 27.2 
North 
Smithfield 
6040 611 623 703 640 475  
Pawtucket 6169 600 1530 722 847 466 64.0 
Portsmouth 5418 812 526 753 1148 571 6.8 
Providence 5965 579 1053 1287 1091 676 78.0 
Scituate 5820 622 532 901 428 588 7.0 
Smithfield 6425 590 780 867 545 653 8.4 
S. Kingston 7526 884 1375 987 961 755 11.3 
Tiverton 6747 1026 410 718 1301 501 15.2 
Cranston 6591 678 667 949 611 716 25.6 
Warwick 7322 742 1359 1155 957 636 22.1 
Westerly 7295 529 1329 951 612 602 26.7 
W. Warwick 7021 792 1167 878 1071 694 37.1 
Woonsocket 5902 600 551 839 714 435 63.9 
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Table 5.2 
The Proportion of Direct Instructional to Total Per Pupil Spending in Rhode Island 
Districts, 2004-2008. 
 
District Total Per Pupil 
Spending 
Direct Instruction 
Spending 
% of Direct 
Instruction 
Providence 13141 5965 45.4 
Jamestown 16744 8003 47.8 
Little Compton 16099 7742 48.1 
Gloucester 14187 6993 49.3 
Foster 14166 7269 51.3 
Newport 13790 7187 52.1 
Central Falls 13463 7009 52.2 
North Kingstown 11473 6011 52.4 
Portsmouth 10305 5418 52.6 
Johnston 13622 7179 52.7 
Pawtucket 11630 6169 53.0 
Bristol-Warren 12572 6699 53.2 
State 12371 6604 53.3 
W. Warwick 13171 7021 53.3 
Narragansett 14947 8003 53.5 
South  Kingston 14058 7526 53.5 
Exeter West Greenwich 12891 6929 53.7 
East Greenwich 11752 6340 53.9 
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District Total Per Pupil 
Spending 
Direct Instruction 
Spending 
% of Direct 
Instruction 
East Providence 11545 6270 54.3 
Westerly 13326 7295 54.7 
Chariho 12152 6663 54.8 
Warwick 13357 7322 54.8 
Scituate 10551 5820 55.1 
Cumberland 9720 5381 55.3 
Burriville 10882 6163 56.6 
Smithfield 11170 6425 57.5 
Cranston 11349 6591 58.1 
Middletown 13359 7804 58.4 
North Providence 12657 7396 58.4 
Tiverton 11529 6747 58.5 
Woonsocket 10070 5902 58.6 
Lincoln 12048 7147 59.3 
Barrington 9909 5946 60.0 
North Smithfield 10050 6040 60.0 
Coventry 10293 6529 63.4 
N. Shorham 24083 15486 64.3 
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APPENDIX A 
Casewise Diagnostics  
Dependent Variable: Reading Achievement  
Case Number Std. Residual reading Predicted Value Residual 
187 -5.083 22.22 67.0109 -44.78869 
188 -3.408 38.46 68.4912 -30.02971 
743 3.723 91.51 58.7011 32.80467 
744 3.528 97.44 66.3553 31.08064 
772 -3.069 38.24 65.2723 -27.03705 
803 -4.098 19.75 55.8591 -36.10602 
 
Dependent Variable: Math Achievement  
Case Number Std. Residual math Predicted Value Residual 
116 -3.173 16.04 49.7054 -33.66261 
339 -3.011 16.92 48.8650 -31.94196 
414 3.342 45.95 10.4938 35.45726 
441 3.125 74.00 40.8446 33.15539 
443 3.333 70.00 34.6445 35.35553 
484 -3.371 19.52 55.2823 -35.76172 
743 -3.332 40.23 75.5729 -35.34302 
763 -4.185 3.45 47.8427 -44.39438 
764 -3.954 4.35 46.2876 -41.93980 
804 -3.217 9.38 43.4971 -34.12214 
812 -3.533 10.29 47.7694 -37.47532 
856 -3.593 30.24 68.3643 -38.12038 
912 -3.450 23.81 60.4081 -36.59860 
1163 -3.392 18.83 54.8186 -35.98455 
 
Dependent Variable: Writing Achievement  
 
Case Number Std. Residual writing Predicted Value Residual 
374 -4.780 .00 54.7639 -54.76389 
417 3.338 41.00 2.7608 38.23923 
487 -4.288 23.26 72.3865 -49.13072 
937 3.701 94.00 51.5933 42.40673 
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